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Abstract. Privacy has been frequently identified as a main concern for
system developers while dealing with/managing personal information.
Despite this, most existing work on privacy requirements deals with them
as a special case of security requirements. Therefore, key aspects of pri-
vacy are, usually, overlooked. In this context, wrong design decisions
might be made due to insufficient understanding of privacy concerns. In
this paper, we address this problem with a systematic literature review
whose main purpose is to identify the main concepts/relations for captur-
ing privacy requirements. In addition, the identified concepts/relations
are further analyzed to propose a novel privacy ontology to be used by
software engineers when dealing with privacy requirements.
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1 Introduction
Increasing numbers of today’s systems deal with personal information (e.g., in-
formation about citizens, customers, etc.), where such information is protected
by privacy laws [99]. Therefore, privacy has become a main concern for system
designers. In other words, dealing with privacy related concerns is a must these
days because privacy breaches may result in huge costs as well as a long-term
consequences [2,97,114,33,34]. Privacy breaches might be due lack of appropri-
ate security policies, bad security practices, attacks, data thefts, etc. [2,144].
However, most of these breaches can be avoided if privacy requirements of the
system-to-be were captured properly during system design (e.g., Privacy by De-
sign (PbD)) [37,36,144], where privacy requirements aim to capture the types
and levels of protection necessary to meet the privacy needs of the users.
Nevertheless, just few works focused on considering privacy during the system
design [104]. More specifically, most existing work on privacy requirements often
deal with them either as non-functional requirements (NFRs) with no specific
criteria on how such requirements can be met [10,261,179], or as a part of secu-
rity [263,130], i.e., focusing mainly on confidentiality and overlooking important
privacy aspects such as anonymity, pseudonymity, unlinkability, unobservability,
etc.
On the other hand, privacy is an elusive and vague concept [213,214,130].
Although several efforts have been made to clarify the privacy concept by linking
it to more refined concepts such as secrecy, person-hood, control of personal
information, etc., there is no consensus on the definition of these concepts or
which of them should be used to analyze privacy [214]. This has resulted in a lot
of confusion among designers and stakeholders, which has led in turn to wrong
design decisions. In this context, a well-defined privacy ontology that captures
privacy related concepts along with their interrelations would constitute a great
step forward in designing privacy-aware systems.
Ontologies have been proven to be a key success factor for eliciting high-
quality requirements, and it can facilitate and improve the job of requirements
engineers [217,128,65], since it can reduce the conceptual vagueness and termi-
nological confusion by providing a shared understanding of the related concepts
between designers and stakeholders [238].
In addition, the ontology should capture privacy requirements in their social
and organizational context. Since most complex systems these days (e.g., health-
care systems, smart cities, etc.) are socio-technical systems [75], which consist
not only of technical components but also of humans along with their interrela-
tions, where different kinds of vulnerabilities might manifest themselves [155,99].
Focusing on the technical aspects and leaving the social and organizational as-
pects outside the system’s boundary leaves the system open to different kinds of
vulnerabilities that might manifest themselves in the social interactions and/or
the organizational structure of the system [155]. The Flash Crash [215] and the
Allied Irish Bank scandal [166] are good examples, where problems were not
caused by mere technical failures, but it were also due to several socio-technical
related vulnerabilities of the system.
This paper applies systematic review techniques to survey available literature
to identify the most mature studies that propose privacy ontologies/concepts. In
addition, we further analyze the selected privacy related concepts/relations to
identify the main ones in order to propose a novel ontology that can be used to
capture privacy requirements. This paper is therefore intended to be a starting
point to address the problem of identifying a core privacy ontology.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows; Section (§2) describes the review
process and the protocol underlining this systematic review. We present and dis-
cuss the review results and findings in Section (§3). In Section (§4) we propose
a novel ontology for privacy requirements engineering. We discuss threats to va-
lidity in Section (§5). Related work is presented in Section (§6), and we conclude
and discuss future work in Section (§7).
2 Review Process
A systematic review can be defined as a systematic process for defining research
questions, searching the literature for the best available resources to answer such
questions, and collecting available data from the resources for answering the
research questions. Following [139,136], the review process (depicted in Figure
1) consists of three main phases:
1. Planning the review, in which we formulate the research questions and we
define the review protocol.
2. Conducting the review, in which we conduct the search process after identi-
fying the search terms and the literature sources, and then we perform the
study selection activity.
3. Reporting the results of the review, in which we collect detailed information
from the selected studies in order to answer the research questions, and then
we use the obtained data to answer the research questions, which we discuss
in the following section.
2.1 Planning the review
This phase is very important for the success of the review, for it is here that we
define the research objectives and the way in which the review will be carried
out. This includes two main activities: (1) formulating the research questions
that the systematic review will answer; and (2) defining the review protocol
that specifies the main procedures to be taken during the review.
Research questions Formulating the review questions is a very critical activity
since these questions are used to derive the entire systematic review methodology
[139]. Therefore, we formulate the following four Research Questions (RQ) to
identify the main privacy concepts that have been presented in the literature:
RQ1 What are the privacy concepts/relations that have been used to capture
privacy concerns?
RQ2 What are the main concepts/relations that have been used for capturing
privacy requirements?
RQ3 Do existing privacy studies cover the main privacy concepts/relations?
RQ4 What are the limitations of existing privacy studies?
Define the review protocol The review protocol specifies the methods to be
followed while conducting the systematic review. Based on [139,136], a review
protocol should specify the following: the strategy that will be used to search
for primary studies selection; study selection criteria; study quality assessment
criteria; data extraction and dissemination strategies. In the rest of this section,
we discuss how we specify and perform each of these activities.
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Fig. 1: The systematic review process
2.2 Conducting the review
This phase is composed of two main activities: 1- search strategy; and 2- study
selection, where each of them is composed of several sub-activities. In what
follows, we discuss them.
Search strategy The search strategy aims to find as many studies relating to
the research questions as possible using an objective and repeatable search strat-
egy [139]. The search activity consists of three main sub-activities: 1- identify
the search terms, 2- identify the literature resources, and 3- conduct the search
process.
Identify the search terms. Following [139,136], we derived the main search
terms from the research questions. In particular, we used the Boolean AND to
link the major terms, and we use the Boolean OR to incorporate alternative
synonyms of such terms. The resulting search terms are: (Privacy AND (ontology
OR ontologies OR taxonomy OR taxonomies ) OR (Privacy requirements).
Identify the literature resources. Six electronic database resources were
used to primarily extract data for this research. These include: IEEE Xplore,
ACM Digital Library, Springer, ACM library, Google Scholar, and Citseerx.
Conduct the search process. The search process (shown in Figure 2)
consists of two main stages:
Search stage 1. We have used the search terms to search the six electronic
database sources, and only papers with relevant titles have been selected;
Search stage 2. The reference lists of all primary selected papers were carefully
checked, and several relevant papers (25 papers) were identified and added
to the list of the primary selected papers.
Study selection. The selection process (shown in Figure 2) consists of two
main stages.
Selection stage 1 (primary selection). Searching the electronic database
source returned 240 relevant papers, among which we have identified and
removed 33 duplicated papers. Next, we have applied the primary selection
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Fig. 2: Paper search and selection process
criteria on the remaining 207 papers. In particular, we have read the ab-
stract, introduction, and then we skimmed through the rest of paper. We
removed all the papers that are not published in the English language, and
we excluded all papers that are not related to any of our research questions.
Moreover, when we were able to identify multiple version of the same paper,
only the most complete one was included. Finally, we excluded any paper
that has been published before 1996, since we were not able to find any
concrete work related to our research before 1996. The primary selection
inclusion and exclusion criteria are shown in Table 1. The outcome of this
selection stage was 107 papers, i.e., we have excluded 100 papers.
Selection stage 2 (Quality Assessment (QA)). At this stage, the QA cri-
teria has been applied to the papers that have resulted from the first selection
stage (107 papers) along with the papers that have resulted from the second
search stage (25 papers), for a total of 132 papers. In order to identify the
most relevant studies that can be used to answer our research questions, we
formulated five QA questions (shown in Table 2) to evaluate the relevance,
completeness, and quality of the studies, where each question has only two
answers: Yes = 1 or No= 0. The quality score for each study is computed
by summing the scores of its QA questions, and the paper is selected only
if it scored at least 4. As a result, 98 papers were excluded and 34 studies
were selected. The result of the QA of the studies is presented in Table 7 in
Appendix A.
2.3 Reporting the results
The final phase of the systematic review involves summarizing the results, and it
consists of two main activities: 1- data synthesis; and 2- results and discussion.
Table 1: Primary selection inclusion and exclusion criteria
Inclusion criteria Exclusion criteria
a. All papers published in the English lan-
guage
a. Papers that are not published in the En-
glish language
b. Papers related to at least one of the re-
search questions
b. Papers that do not have any link with the
research questions
c. Relevant papers that are published from
1996 to 2016
c. If a paper has several versions only the
most complete one is included
Data synthesis In what follows, we describe how data syntheses were exe-
cuted: Data related to RQ1 can be extracted directly from the list of selected
papers (shown in Table 3). To answer RQ2, the contents of the 34 selected stud-
ies were further analyzed to identify privacy related concepts along with their
interrelations, and list them in a comprehensive table (Table 4). Moreover, we
identify the main concepts/relations for capturing privacy requirements based
on Table 4 & Table 5 that shows the frequency of concepts/relations appearance
in the selected studies. To answer RQ3 data can be derived from Table 6, which
summaries the percentage of the main concepts/relations categories that each
selected study cover. RQ4 can be answered by categorizing the studies into four
group based on the concepts categories they do not cover.
3 Review results and discussion
This section presents and discusses the findings of this review. First, we start by
presenting an overview of the selected studies, and then, we present the findings
of this review concerning the research questions.
Overview of selected studies3. 34 studies were selected, where 5 studies
were from book chapters, 10 papers were published in journals, 11 papers ap-
peared in conference proceedings, 6 papers came from workshops, and 2 papers
were extracted from symposiums. The number of papers by year of publication
is presented in Figure 3; while the percentages of the selected studies based on
their publishing type are represented in Figure 4.
3 An overview of all considered studies is shown in Table 8 in Appendix B
Table 2: Quality assessment questions
Quality assessment questions
Q1 Are the objectives of the proposed work clearly justified?
Q2 Are the proposed concepts/relations clearly defined?
Q3 Does the work propose sufficient concepts/relations to deal with privacy aspects?
Q4 Have the concepts/relations been applied to project/case study, or have they
been justified by appropriate examples?
Q5 Does the work add value to the state-of-the-art1?
1Evaluated based on the number of citations taking into consideration the year of publication






























	


























 





Fig. 3: Number of papers by year of publication
RQ1:What are the privacy concepts/relations that have been used to capture
privacy concerns? The review has identified 34 studies that provide concepts and
relations that can be used for capturing privacy requirements. The list of the
selected studies that answers our first research question (RQ1 ) is presented in
Table 3, where each paper is described by its identifier, title, author(s), publica-
tion year and number of citation. In what follows, we present a summary of the
contributions of each selected study.
ACM 03 [240], “Elaborating Security Requirements by Construction of Inten-
tional Anti-Models”. Lamsweerde [240] proposed a goal-oriented approach
that extends the KAOS framework for modeling and analyzing security re-
quirements. The framework focus on generating and resolving obstacles/anti-
15%
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18%
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Book chapters
Journals
Conferences
Workshops
Symposiums
Fig. 4: Percentages of selected studies
Table 3: The list of the selected studies
Study ID Title of the study Author(s) Year#Cite
ACM 03 [240] Elaborating Security Requirements by Construction of Intentional
Anti-Models
V. Lam-
sweerde
2004 337
ACM 14 [144] Modeling of privacy-aware business processes in BPMN to protect per-
sonal data
Labda et al. 2014 0
ACM 16 [28] Introducing privacy in a hospital information system Braghin et al. 2008 9
ACM 35 [211] Ontologies for Modeling Enterprise Level Security Metrics A. Singhal,
D. Wijesekera
2010 7
ACM 40 [248] OVM: an ontology for vulnerability management J. Wang and
G. Minzhe
2009 40
IEEE 12 [221] Using Security and Domain ontologies for Security Requirements Anal-
ysis
Souag et al. 2013 4
IEEE 15 [235] Towards an Ontology-based Security Management B. Tsoumas,
D. Gritzalis
2006 88
IEEE 50 [100] Modeling security requirements through ownership, permission and
delegation
Giorgini et al. 2005 198
IEEE 57 [132] A Security Ontology with MDA for Software Development W. Kang,
Y. Liang
2013 1
CIT 07 [241] Modeling Reusable Security Requirements Based on an Ontology
Framework
Lasheras et al. 2009 30
CIT 33 [155] Security and Privacy Requirements Analysis within a Social Setting Liu et al. 2006 75
Spgr 07 [162] An Extended Ontology for Security Requirements Massacci et al. 2011 16
Spgr 13 [71] A Modeling Ontology for Integrating Vulnerabilities into Security Re-
quirements Conceptual Foundation
Elahi et al. 2009 21
SCH 18 [208] Eliciting security requirements with misuse cases G. Sindre and
A. Opdahl
2005 830
SCH 24 [130] Addressing privacy requirements in system design: the PriS method Kalloniatis
et al.
2008 76
SCH 28 [179] Secure Tropos: a security-oriented extension of the Tropos methodol-
ogy
H. Mouratidis,
P. Giorgini
2007 193
SCH 41 [214] A taxonomy of privacy D. Solove 2006 967
Spgr 18 03 [81] Formalizing information security knowledge S. Fenz, A.
Ekelhart
2009 144
Spgr 13 01 [15] Risk as dependability metrics for the evaluation of business solutions:
a model-driven approach
Asnar et al. 2008 30
Spgr 13 02 [59] The CORAS methodology. model-based risk assessment using UML
and UP
Braber et al. 2003 66
Spgr 13 03 [72] A vulnerability-centric requirements engineering framework. analyzing
security attacks, countermeasures, and requirements based on vulner-
abilities
Elahi et al. 2010 73
Spgr 13 04 [123] UMLsec: Extending UML for secure systems development J. Ju¨rjens 2002 583
Spgr 13 05 [167] Adapting Secure Tropos for security risk management in the early
phases of information systems development
Matulevicˇius
et al.
2008 60
Spgr 13 07 [199] An extended misuse case notation: Including vulnerabilities and the
insider threat
L. Røstad 2006 46
Spgr 08 01 [169] Model-based management of information system security risk N. Mayer 2009 70
Spgr 08 03 [63] A knowledge-based approach to security requirements for e-health ap-
plications
Dritsas et al. 2006 17
Spgr 07 02 [263] A requirements engineering methodology for trust, security, and pri-
vacy
N. Zannone 2007 17
Spgr 07 03 [152] Introducing abuse frames for analysing security requirements Lin et al. 2003 73
Spgr 03 01 [16] Basic Concepts and Taxonomy of Dependable and Secure Avizˇienis
et al.
2004 3703
Spgr 02 01 [13] From trust to dependability through risk analysis Asnar et al. 2007 57
Spgr 02 02 [14] Risk modelling and reasoning in goal models Asnar et al. 2006 17
SCH 24 02 [114] Privacy risk models for designing privacy-sensitive ubiquitous comput-
ing systems
Hong et al. 2004 218
SCH 28 01 [186] STS-Tool Security Requirements Engineering for Socio-Technical Sys-
tems
Paja et al. 2014 2
SCH 43 01 [239] Handbook of privacy and privacy-enhancing technologies Blarkom et al. 2003 69
goals to goal satisfaction, i.e., it addresses malicious obstacles/anti-goals
(threats) set up by attackers to threaten security goals, and the new
security requirements are obtained as countermeasures to resolve these
obstacles/anti-goals (threats). The framework adopts several main concepts
from KAOS (e.g., agents, goals, etc.) and proposes concepts for building
intentional threat models (e.g., obstacles, anti-goal, anti-requirements, at-
tacker, etc.).
ACM 14 [144], “Modeling of Privacy-aware Business Processes in BPMN to
Protect Personal Data”. Labda et al. [144] propose a privacy-aware Business
Processes (BP) framework for modeling, reasoning and enforcing privacy
constraints. They have identified several privacy-related concepts, including:
Data, User, Action, Purpose, and Permissions. In addition, they identify five
concepts that can be used for analysis privacy in BP: (1) Access control, (2)
Separation of Tasks (SoT), (3) Binding of Tasks (BoT), (4) User consent,
(5) Necessity to know (NtK).
ACM 16 [28], “Introducing Privacy in a Hospital Information System”.
Braghin et al. [28] presented an approach that supports expressing and en-
forcing privacy-related policies. The approach extends the conceptual model
of an open source hospital information system (Care2x) with concepts for
role-based privacy management (e.g., subject, processor, and controller),
and concepts for supporting the privacy enforcement mechanisms (actions),
where such actions can be either inactive or declarative, where the former
includes actions that require to access and process data, while the latter
includes simple statements representing activities that do not require to in-
teract with the system.
ACM 35 [211], “Ontologies for Modeling Enterprise Level Security Metrics”.
Singhal and Wijesekera [211] provide a security ontology that supports IT
security risk analysis. The ontology identifies which threats endanger which
assets and what countermeasures can reduce the probability of the occur-
rence of a related attack. The concepts of the ontology, includes: threat, a
potential violation of security, an attack exploits vulnerabilities to realize a
threat, where vulnerabilities are characteristics of target assets that make
them prone to attack, and a risk is an expectation of loss expressed as a
probability that a particular threat will exploit a certain vulnerability, which
will result in a harmful result. Finally, security mechanisms are designed to
prevent threats from happening or mitigating their impact when they occur.
ACM 40 [248], “OVM: An Ontology for Vulnerability Management”. Wang
and Guo [248] propose an ontology for vulnerability management (OVM)
that capture the fundamental concepts in information security and their re-
lationship, retrieve vulnerable assets (data) and reason about the cause and
impact of such vulnerabilities. The ontology has been built based on the
Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE), Common Weakness Enu-
meration (CWE), Common Platform Enumeration (CPE), and Common
Attack Pattern Enumeration and Classification (CAPEC). The top level
concepts of the ontology includes, a Vulnerability existing in an IT Product
that can be exploited by an Attacker through an Attack that compromises
the IT Product and cause Consequence. Moreover, Countermeasures can be
used to protect the IT Product through mitigating the Vulnerability.
CIT 07 [241], “Modeling Reusable Security Requirements Based on an Ontol-
ogy Framework”. Velasco et al. [241] propose an ontology-based framework
for representing and reusing security requirements based on risk analysis.
The ontology is based on two ontologies: 1- the risk analysis ontology that
is developed based on MAGERIT [159], and identifies five types of risk ele-
ments: asset, threat, safeguard, valuation dimension, valuation criteria, and
2- the requirements ontology that models reusable requirements along with
their relationships.
CIT 33 [155], “Security and Privacy Requirements Analysis within a Social
Setting”. Liu et al. [155] propose a framework for dealing with security and
privacy requirements within an agent-oriented modeling framework. They
extend i* modeling language to deal with security and privacy requirements,
where i* language allows for analyzing security/privacy issues within their
social context, which enables for a systematic way of deriving vulnerabili-
ties and threats. Moreover, i* models make it possible to conduct different
countermeasure analyses for addressing vulnerabilities and suggesting coun-
termeasures for them.
IEEE 12 [221], “Using Security and Domain ontologies for Security Require-
ments Analysis”. Souag et al. [221] introduce an ontology-based method
for discovering Security Requirements (SR). The process that underlies
this method has three main steps, and it starts with the elicitation step
that constructs an initial i* requirements model from the stakeholders’
needs/concerns about security. The second step is the SR analysis that de-
pends on production rules to exploit the security-specific ontology to discover
threats, vulnerabilities, countermeasures, and resources. These concepts are
used to enrich the requirements model by adding new elements (malicious
tasks, vulnerability points, etc.). Finally, the domain specific SR analysis
step, in which another set of rules explores the domain ontology to improve
the requirements model with resources, actors and other concepts that are
more specific to the domain at hand.
IEEE 15 [235], “Towards an Ontology-based Security Management”. Tsoumas
and Gritzalis [235] introduce a security management framework that pro-
poses a Security Ontology (SO), which contains the following concepts, a
stakeholder possesses an asset, which in turn can be compromised by a vul-
nerability. While a threat initiated by a threat agent targets an asset and
exploits a vulnerability of the asset in order to achieve its goal. Exploitation
of a vulnerability leads to the realization of an unwanted incident, which
has a certain impact. Furthermore, countermeasures reduce the impact of
the threat with the use of controls. Finally, security policy formulates the
controls into a manageable security framework possessed by stakeholders.
IEEE 50 [100], “Modeling Security Requirements through Ownership, Permis-
sion and Delegation”. Giorgini et al. [100] introduce Secure Tropos, a formal
framework for modeling and analyzing security requirements in their social
and organizational context. Secure Tropos proposes several concepts includ-
ing, an actor that covers two concepts (a role and an agent), a goal that can
be refined through and/or-decompositions of a root goal into finer sub-goals,
a task, and a resource. Secure Tropos adopts the notion of delegation to
model the transfer of objectives (goals and tasks) from one actor to another,
and it adopts resource provision among actors. Moreover, it introduces the
ownership concept that capture the relation between actors and resources
they own. Finally, it provides the trust concept to capture the actors’ expec-
tations in one another concerning their social dependencies, and it introduce
the monitoring concept to compensate the lack of trust/distrust among ac-
tors concerning social dependencies.
IEEE 57 [132], “A Security Ontology with MDA for Software Development”.
Kang and Liang [132] propose security ontology for software development
based on Model Driven Architecture (MDA) paradigm. The ontology in-
cludes most popular security concerns mentioned in literature such as audit-
ing, threats, accountability, non-repudiation, risk, attacks, availability, frauds,
confidentiality, asset, integrity, prevention, and Reputation.
SCH 18 [132], “Eliciting Security Requirements with Misuse Cases”. Sindre
and Opdahl [132] present a systematic approach to eliciting security require-
ments based on use cases. They extend the traditional use case approach to
also consider misuse cases that represent unwanted behavior in the system
to be developed. In particular, a use case diagram contains both, use cases
and actors, as well as misuse cases and misusers. In addition, misuse cases
adopts the ordinary use case relationships such as include, extend, and gen-
eralize. A use case is related to a misuse case using a directed association,
which means that a misuse case threatens the use case. Moreover, a use
case diagram can contain security use cases, which are special use cases that
can mitigate misuse cases. In summary, an ordinary use cases represent re-
quirements, security cases represent security requirements, and misuse cases
represent security threats.
SCH 24 [130], “Addressing Privacy Requirements in System Design. the PriS
Method”. Kalloniatis et al. [130] introduce PriS, a security requirements
engineering method that consider users’ privacy requirements. PriS consid-
ers privacy requirements as business goals and provides a methodological
approach for analysing their effect onto the organizational processes. The
conceptual model of PriS is based on the Enterprise Knowledge Develop-
ment (EKD) framework [156], and it includes a set of concepts for modeling
privacy requirements, such as: stakeholders, goals that can be either strate-
gic goals or operational goals, and goals can be realized by processes. On
the other hand, privacy requirements are a special type of goals (privacy
goals), which constraint the causal transformation of organizational goals
into processes. Privacy goals may be decomposed in simpler goals or may
support/ conflict the achievement of other goals. Moreover, eight types of
privacy goals have been identified corresponding to the eight privacy con-
cerns namely, authentication, authorisation, identification, data protection,
anonymity, pseydonymity, unlinkability, and unobservability.
SCH 28 [179], “Secure Tropos: a Security-oriented Extension of the Tropos
Methodology”. Mouratidis and Giorgini [179] introduce extensions to the
Tropos methodology [32] to model security concerns throughout the whole
development process. Secure Tropos adopts from Tropos methodology con-
cepts for modeling actors, goals, resources, along with their different relations
and social dependencies. In addition, it introduces concepts for modeling se-
curity requirements, such as a security constraint (e.g., privacy, integrity,
and availability), which can be decomposed into one or more security sub-
constraints. Security constraint modeling is divided into security constraint
delegation, security constraint assignment, and security constraint analysis.
Secure Tropos also introduces secure entity, security features, security mech-
anisms, a secure capability, a secure dependency, and the threat concept.
SCH 41 [214], “A Taxonomy of Privacy”. Solove [214] provides taxonomy for
understanding a wide range of privacy related problems. The taxonomy
specifies four main groups of possible harmful activities: (i) information
collection: creates disruption based on the process of data gathering Two
sub-classifications of information collection have been identified, surveillance
and interrogation. (ii) information processing: refers to the use, stor-
age, and manipulation of data that has been collected. Five different sub-
classifications of information processing have been identified: aggregation,
identification, insecurity, secondary use, and Exclusion. (iii) information
dissemination: in which the data holders transfer the information to others.
Seven different sub-classifications of information dissemination have been
identified: breach of confidentiality, disclosure, exposure, increased accessi-
bility, blackmail, appropriation, and 7- distortion. (iv) invasion: involves
impingements directly on the individual. Two different sub-classifications of
information invasion have been identified: intrusion and 2-decisional inter-
ference.
Spgr 07 [162], “An Extended Ontology for Security Requirements. Massacci et
al. [162] propose ontology for security requirements engineering, the ontol-
ogy adopts concepts from Secure Tropos methodology [163], Problem Frame
[107], and several industrial case studies. The most general concept in the
ontology is Thing. An object is a thing that persists, and an event is an
instantaneous happening that changes some objects. The object concept can
be specialized into proposition, situation, entity and relationship. A proposi-
tion is an object representing a true/false statement. A situation is a partial
world described by a proposition. An entity is an object that has a distinct,
separate existence from all other things, though that existence need not be
material. Entity is specialized into Actor, Action, Process, Resource, and
Asset. Relationship can be specialized into do-dependency, can-dependency,
trust-dependency, and/or refinement, contributes, provides, uses. In addition,
damages is a relationship between an attack and an asset, where the attack
causes harm to the asset. Exploits is a relationship between attack and vul-
nerability. Protects relates a security goal to an asset. Finally, denies relates
an anti-goal to a requirement. Finally, a specification is an entity consisting
of actions, quality propositions, and domain assumptions. Vulnerability is a
specialization of Situation and is adopted from the Security domain. While
a threatconsists of a situation that includes an attacker and one or more
vulnerabilities.
Spgr 13 [71], “A Modeling Ontology for Integrating Vulnerabilities into Se-
curity Requirements Conceptual Foundation”. Elahi et al. [71] propose a
vulnerability-centric modeling ontology, which integrates empirical knowl-
edge of vulnerabilities into the system development process. They identify
a set of core concepts for security requirements elicitation, and they iden-
tify another set of concepts for capturing vulnerabilities and their effects
on the system. The ontology contains several concepts, including: a con-
crete element that is a tangible entity (e.g., an activity, task, etc.), and it
may bring a vulnerability into the system. Exploitation of vulnerabilities can
have effects on other elements (affected elements), where the effect relation
is characterized by the severity attribute. An attack involves the execution
of malicious actions that one or more actors perform to satisfy some mali-
cious goal. A concrete element may have a security impact on attacks, which
can be interpreted as a security countermeasure that can be used to patch
vulnerabilities.
Spgr 02 01 [13], “From Trust to Dependability Through Risk Analysis”. As-
nar et al. [13] present an extension of the Tropos Goal-Risk framework. In
particular, they introduce an approach to assess risk on the basis of trust
relations among actors. In particular, they introduce the notion of trust to
extend the risk assessment process. Using this framework, an actor can as-
sess the risk in delegating the fulfillment of his objectives and decide whether
or not the risk is acceptable. They also introduce the notion of trust level
proposing three trust levels: Trust, Distrust, and NTrust (i.e., neither trust
nor distrust), where a low level of trust increases the risk perceived by the
depender about the achievement of his objectives.
Spgr 02 02 [14], “Risk Modeling and Reasoning in Goal Models”. Asnar et
al. [14] propose a goal-oriented approach for modeling and reasoning about
risks at requirements level, where risks are introduced and analyzed along
the stakeholders goals and countermeasures. Their proposed framework is
based on the Tropos methodology and extends it with new concepts and
qualitative reasoning mechanisms to consider risks since the early phases
of the requirements analysis. In their framework, a risk is an event that
has a negative impact on the satisfaction of a goal, while a treatment is a
countermeasure that can be adopted in order to mitigate the effects of the
risk. Moreover, they consider likelihood as a property of the event, and they
capture the likelihood by the level of evidence that supports and prevents
the occurrence of the event (SAT and DEN). On the other hand, impact is
used to capture the influence of an event to the goal fulfillment, and they
classify impact under: strong positive, positive, negative, and strong negative.
Spgr 03 01 [16], “Basic Concepts and Taxonomy of Dependable and Secure
Computing”. Avizienis et al. [16] propose a new taxonomy for dependable
and secure computing based on an extensive analysis of the related literature.
The authors provide precise definitions characterizing the various concepts
that come into play when addressing the dependability and security of com-
puting and communication systems. The three top-level dimensions of this
taxonomy are: attribute, threat, and means. The concept of attribute is an-
alyzed in terms of: availability; reliability; safety; confidentiality; integrity;
and maintainability. The concept of threat is further refined in terms of fault,
error, and failure. While the concept of means is used to attain the various
attributes of dependability and security, where these means can be grouped
into four main categories: fault prevention; fault tolerance; fault removal ;
and fault forecasting.
Spgr 07 02 [263], “A Requirements Engineering Methodology for Trust, Secu-
rity, and Privacy”. Zannone [263] introduces the Secure i* (SI*) methodology
that adopts from Secure Tropos the concepts of actors, goals, resources, along
with their different relations and social dependencies, and it proposes new
relation among roles, namely supervision. In SI*, an actor is defined along
with a set of objectives, capabilities, and entitlements, which can be modeled
through relations between actors and services (goals, tasks, and resources),
namely: (1) require indicates that an actor intends to achieve a service, (2)
be entitled indicates that an actor is the legitimate owner of a service, and
(3) provide indicates that the actor has the capability to achieve a service.
The delegation concept is refined in SI* into: (1) Delegation of execution
(De), and (2) Delegation of permission (De). In addition, the trust concept
is refined to cope with the refinement of delegation they propose into: (1)
Trust of execution (Te), and (2) Trust of permission (Tp).
Spgr 07 03 [152], “Introducing Abuse Frames for Analysing Security Require-
ments”. Lin et al. [152] develop an approach using Problem Frames to an-
alyze security problems in order to determine security vulnerabilities. In
particular, they introduce the notion of an anti-requirement as the require-
ment of a malicious user that can subvert an existing requirement, and they
incorporate anti-requirements into abuse frames to represent the notion of
a security threat that is imposed by malicious users in a particular problem
context.
Spgr 08 01 [169], “Model-based Management of Information System Security
Risk”. Mayer [169] proposes ISSRM (Information System Security Risk Man-
agement), a security risk management model. The ISSRM reference model
addresses risk management at three different levels, combining together as-
set, risk, and risk treatment views, and it proposes concepts that are ordered
in three main groups: (i) Asset-related concepts describe what assets
are important to protect, and what criteria guarantee asset security; (ii)
Risk-related concepts present how the risk itself is defined. A risk is the
combination of a threat with one or more vulnerabilities leading to a negative
impact harming the assets ; and (iii) Risk treatment-related concepts
describe what decisions, requirements and controls should be defined and
implemented in order to mitigate possible risks.
Spgr 08 03 [63], “A Knowledge-based Approach to Security Requirements for
E-health Applications”. Dritsas et al. [63] propose an ontology that includes
the main security related concepts, and use the ontology for designing and
developing a set of security patterns that address a subset of these require-
ments for applications that provide e-health services. The concepts used in
the proposed ontology includes: stakeholder, objective, threat, countermea-
sure, asset, vulnerability, deliberate attack, security pattern and security pat-
tern context. A security pattern provides a specific set of countermeasures,
and a security pattern context is defined as a set of asset, vulnerability, and
deliberate attack triplets. Therefore, one can start from the generic security
objectives, find the security pattern contexts that match them and choose
specific security pattern, which ensures that the high level security objectives
can be fulfilled by implementing the respective countermeasures.
Spgr 13 01 [15], “Risk as Dependability Metrics for the Evaluation of Busi-
ness Solutions: a Model-driven Approach”. Asnar et al. [15] adopt and ex-
tend the Tropos Goal Model [14,13] by considering also the interdependency
among the actors within an organization. Through this extension analysts
can assess the risk perceived by each actor, taking into account the organi-
zational environment where the actor acts. Based on such analysis, we have
provided a method to assist analysts in determining the treatments to be
introduced in order to make risks be acceptable by all actors.
Spgr 13 02 [59], “The CORAS Methodology: Model-based Risk Assessment
Using UML and UP”. Braber [59] introduces the CORAS methodology in
which the Unified Modeling Language (UML) and Unified Process (UP) are
combined to support a model-based risk assessment of security-critical sys-
tems. The CORAS ontology propose several concepts, such as context that
influences the target, which contains assets and has its security requirements.
Security requirements lead to security policies, which protect assets by reduc-
ing its related vulnerabilities that can be exploited by threats, which might
reduce the value of the asset. A Risk contains an unwanted incident that
has a certain consequence and frequency of occurrence.
Spgr 13 03 [72], “A Vulnerability-centric Requirements Engineering Frame-
work: Analyzing Security Attacks, Countermeasures, and Requirements based
on Vulnerabilities. Elahi et al. [72] adopt and extend their previous work [71]
by proposing an agent- and goal-oriented framework for eliciting and analyz-
ing security requirements. They refined the goal model evaluation method
that helps analysts verifying whether top goals are satisfied with the risk
of vulnerabilities and attacks and assess the efficacy of security counter-
measures against such risks. More specifically, the evaluation does not only
specify if the goals are satisfied, but also makes it possible to understand why
and how the goals are satisfied (or denied) by tracing back the evaluation to
vulnerabilities, attacks, and countermeasures.
Spgr 13 04 [123], “UMLsec: Extending UML for Secure Systems Develop-
ment”. Ju¨rjens [123] proposes UMLsec that is an extension to UML modeling
language, which allows for integrating security requirements modeling and
analysis within the system development process. UMLsec is able to model
security related features such as secrecy, integrity, access control, etc. It rep-
resents security feature on UML diagrams by providing several extension
mechanisms, namely: (1) stereotypes: a new types of modeling elements that
extends the semantics of existing types in the UML meta-model; (2) tagged
values: that is used to associate data with model elements and (3) con-
straints: that are used to define criteria to determine whether requirements
are met or not by the system design. In UMLsec, integrity is modeled as a
constraint, which can restrict unwanted modification (e.g., insert), but infor-
mation quality can be affected in several other ways that cannot be captured
by this approach.
Spgr 13 05 [167], “Adapting Secure Tropos for Security Risk Management in
the Early Phases of Information Systems Development”. Matulevicˇius et al.
[167] have analyzed how Secure Tropos can be applied to analyze security
risks at the early IS development phases. Their analysis suggested a number
of improvements for Secure Tropos in order to deal better with security
risk management activities. In particular, Secure Tropos could be improved
with additional constructs adopted from existing security risk management
models (e.g., ISSRM (Information System Security Risk Management)) such
as risk, risk treatment, and control. More specifically, among the suggested
risk-related concepts is a risk that presents how the risk itself is defined, what
are the major principles that should be taken into account when defining the
possible risks. The risk is described by the cause of the risk, and the impact
of the risk captures the potential negative consequence of the risk, which can
be represented by a negative contribution link between the attack and the
related security constraint, i.e., the impact negates the security criteria.
Spgr 13 07 [199], “An Extended Misuse Case Notation: Including Vulnerabil-
ities”. Røstad [199] proposes an extended misuse case notation that includes
the ability to represent vulnerabilities and the insider threat. In particular,
beside the main concepts of misuse case notation (e.g., actors, use cases, mis-
use cases, misusers, etc.). Røstad introduce the insider concept to capture
inside attackers, since the misuser concept in misuse cases was mainly pro-
posed to address outside attackers. More specifically, an insider is a misusers
that is also member of an authorized group for the entity being attacked. In
addition, she introduce the vulnerability concept that is a weakness in the
system, which can be exploited by the insider.
Spgr 18 03 [81], “Formalizing Information Security Knowledge”. Fenz and
Ekelhar [81] introduce security ontology for information security domain
knowledge. In their ontology, a vulnerability is the absence of a proper safe-
guard,which could be exploited by a threat. A threat might threaten an asset,
and it can be exploited by predefined threat, and mitigation is achieved by
the implementation of one or more control. In addition, the severity of each
vulnerability is rated by a three-point scale (high, medium, and low). A threat
has a source, and a related security objectives. An asset is categorized either
as a tangible or an intangible asset. While the data concept comprises meta-
data on the knowledge of an organization. The person concept is used to
model physical persons in the ontology, and the organization concept com-
prises organizations in the broadest sense and assigns roles to them. A role
is a physical person or organization relevant to the organization. Finally, a
location is used to relate location and threat information in order to assign
a priori threat probabilities.
SCH 24 02 [114], “Privacy Risk Models for Designing Privacy-sensitive Ubiq-
uitous Computing Systems”. Hong et al. [114] propose a privacy risk model
that captures privacy concerns at high abstraction level, and then refining
them into concrete issues for specific applications. The privacy risk model
consists of two parts: (1) a privacy risk analysis that poses a series of ques-
tions to help designers think about the social and organizational context in
which an application will be used, the technology used to implement that
application, and control and feedback mechanisms that end-users will use;
and (2) privacy risk management that takes the unordered list of privacy
risks from the privacy risk analysis, prioritizes them, and helps design teams
identify solutions for helping end-users manage those issues.
SCH 28 01 [186], “STS-Tool: Security Requirements Engineering for Socio-
Technical”. Paja et al. [186] present the STS-Tool, a modeling and analysis
support tool for STS-ml (Socio-Technical Security modeling language), a se-
curity requirements modeling language for socio-technical systems. STS-ml
consists of three complementary views: 1- The social view, 2- The informa-
tion view, 3- The authorization view. Through these views, STS-ml supports
different types of security needs: (1) Interaction (security) needs are security-
related constraints on goal delegations and document provisions; (2) Autho-
risation needs determine which information can be used, how, for which
purpose, and by whom; (3) Organisational constraints constrain the adop-
tion of roles and the uptake of responsibilities. In addition, STS-ml supports
the following interaction security needs: 1. Over goal delegations: (a) No-
redelegation, (b) Non-repudiation, (c) Redundancy, (d) Trustworthiness, and
(e) Availability. 2. Over-document provisions: (a) Integrity of transmission,
(b) Confidentiality of transmission, (c) Availability. 3. From organizational
constraints: (a) Separation of duties (SoD), and (b) Combination of duties
(CoD).
SCH 43 01 [239], “Handbook of Privacy and Privacy-enhancing Technolo-
gies”. Van Blarkom et al. [239] investigate several active areas related to
privacy, Privacy-Enhancing Technologies (PET), intelligent software agents,
and the inter-relations among these areas. Furthermore, they discussed the
concepts of privacy and data protection, the European Directives that rule
the protection of personal data and the relevant definitions. In particular,
they investigate when personal data items become non-identifiable, the sen-
sitivity of data, automated decisions, privacy preferences, and policies. In
addition, they discussed existing technological solutions that offer agent user
privacy protection, known under the name Privacy-Enhancing Technologies
(PETs), the set of technologies/ principles that underlying PETs, and the
legal basis for PET. Moreover, they discussed the Common Criteria for Infor-
mation Technology Security Evaluation (CC) supplies important information
for building privacy secure agents.
RQ2: What are the main concepts/relations that have been used for cap-
turing privacy requirements? Each of the 34 selected studies has been deeply
investigated to identify any concept/relation that can be used for capturing pri-
vacy requirements. We have focused on identifying any concept/relation that
can be used for capturing privacy requirements in their social and organiza-
tional context. More specifically, we tried to identify any concept that is related
to privacy, social and organizational threats that might threaten privacy needs,
treatment/countermeasures that can be used to mitigate threats concerning pri-
vacy needs. The result is shown in Table 4, which presents the concepts/relations
that have been identified in each selected studies. In particular, 55 concepts and
relations4 have been identified, which have been grouped into four main groups
based on their types:
Organizational. 27 concepts and relations have been identified for capturing the
agentive entities of the system in terms of their objectives, entitlements, depen-
dencies and their expectations concerning such dependencies. The organizational
concepts and relations are further grouped into four sub-categories:
Agentive entities. 8 concepts and relations have been identified for capturing
the active entities of the system (e.g., actor, user, etc. ).
Intentional entities. 5 concepts and relations have been identified for capturing
objectives that active entities aim for achieve/want to perform (e.g., goal, task,
activity, etc. ).
Informational entities. 8 concepts and relations have been identified for cap-
turing informational assets (e.g., data, asset, information, etc.).
Entities interactions. 6 concepts and relations have been identified for captur-
ing the entities dependencies and expectations concerning such dependencies
(e.g., delegation, dependency, provision, trust, etc. ).
Risk. 10 concepts and relations have been identified for capturing risk related aspects
(e.g., risk, threat, vulnerabilities, attack, etc.).
Treatment. 8 concepts and relations have been identified for capturing treatment
related aspects (e.g., treatment, countermeasure, mitigate etc.).
Privacy. 9 concepts and relations have been identified for capturing privacy related
aspects (e.g., anonymity, confidentiality, etc.).
Among the 55 identified concepts and relations, we have selected 38 main concepts
and relations that can be used for capturing privacy requirements in their social and
organizational context. In particular, these concepts and relations are 17 organizational,
9 risk, 5 treatment, and 7 privacy concepts, and they are shown in Bold typeset in
Table 4. Each of the selected concepts and relations has been chosen based on the
following two criteria: (1) its importance for capturing privacy requirements; and (2)
the frequency of its appearance in the selected studies, which is shown in Table 5.
RQ3: Do existing privacy studies cover the main privacy concepts/relations? We
answer RQ3 by comparing the privacy related concepts/relations presented in each se-
lected study with the main privacy concepts/relations identified while answering RQ2.
In Table 4, we use (X) when the study presents a main privacy concept/relation, and (-)
4 When there are more than one concept with very close meaning, we have chosen the
most appropriate one to represent all
Table 4: Summary of the privacy related concepts and relations identified in the
studies
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impact X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X
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s/p constraint X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X
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s/p mechanism X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X
P
ri
v
a
c
y
sec/priv req. X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X
confidentiality X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X
integrity - - - - - - - - - - - - -
availability - - - - - - - - - - - -
non-repudiation X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X
notice X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X
anonymity X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X
transparency X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X
accountability X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X
Table 5: The frequency of concepts/relations appearance in the selected studies
Conc./rel. # Conc./rel. # Conc./rel. # Conc./rel. #
actor 14 role 10 agent 12 user 5
stakeholder 5 person 1 is a 7 plays 7
goal 15 objective 3 task 12 action 7
refinement 12 asset 14 information 12 data 6
resource 8 personal info. 5 sensitive info. 3 part of 2
own 4 obj. deleg. 7 perm. deleg. 6 info. provision 6
monitor 4 obj. trust 5 perm. trust 3 risk 11
threat 16 intin. threat 7 casual threat 4 vulnerability 15
attack 11 attacker 16 attack method 5 impact 10
threaten 8 exploits 10 countermeasure 15 mitigate 10
control 6 treatment 1 s/p goal 19 s/p constraint 4
s/p policy 4 s/p mechanism 5 sec/priv req. 18 confidentiality 14
integrity 13 availability 12 non-repudiation 3 notice 4
anonymity 4 transparency 3 accountability 2
when the study presents a normal privacy concept/relation. In addition, we use (X) to
mark when a study misses a main concept/relation. Table 6 summarizes the percentage
of the main privacy concepts/relations identified in each selected study with respect
to the main four categories (organizational, risk, treatment, and privacy). Considering
Table 4 and Table 6, it is easy to note that most studies miss main privacy related con-
cepts/relations, i.e., none of them cover all the main privacy related concepts/relations.
In RQ4, we discuss the limitation of each selected study.
RQ4: RQ4 What are the limitations of existing privacy studies? We answer this
question by categorizing the studies into four groups (Group1-4) 5 based on the
concepts categories (e.g., organizational, risk, treatment, and privacy) that the studies
do not appropriately cover:
5 These groups are not mutually exclusive, i.e., a study may belong to all of them
Table 6: The percentage of the main privacy concepts/relations captured by each
selected study
Study Org. Risk Tre. Pri. All Study Org. Risk Tre. Pri. All
ACM 03 [240] 5/17 5/9 2/5 3/7 15/38 ACM 14 [144] 2/17 0/9 0/5 2/7 4/38
ACM 16 [28] 3/17 0/9 2/5 0/7 5/38 ACM 35 [211] 1/17 1/9 2/5 0/7 4/38
ACM 40 [248] 0/17 5/9 1/5 0/7 6/38 CIT 07 [241] 1/17 1/9 0/5 0/7 2/38
CIT 33 [155] 11/17 7/9 4/5 2/7 24/38 IEEE 12 [221] 6/17 6/9 2/5 1/7 15/38
IEEE 15[235] 0/17 5/9 3/5 2/7 10/38 IEEE 50 [100] 15/17 0/9 1/5 2/7 18/38
IEEE 57 [132] 0/17 1/9 1/5 4/7 6/38 Spgr 7 [162] 4/17 5/9 1/5 1/7 11/38
Spgr 13 [71] 2/17 6/9 1/5 1/7 10/38 SCH 18 [208] 1/17 1/9 0/5 0/7 2/38
SCH 24 [130] 0/17 1/9 1/5 0/7 2/38 SCH 28 [179] 8/17 1/9 4/5 3/7 16/38
SCH 41 [214] 5/17 0/9 0/5 3/7 8/38 Spgr 18 03 [81] 2/17 7/9 2/5 0/7 11/38
Spgr 13 01 [15] 3/17 0/9 1/5 0/7 4/38 Spgr 13 02 [59] 0/17 4/9 1/5 1/7 6/38
Spgr 13 03 [72] 10/17 5/9 1/5 1/7 17/38 Spgr 13 04 [123] 1/17 2/9 1/5 1/7 4/38
Spgr 13 05 [167] 10/17 4/9 2/5 1/7 17/38 Spgr 13 07 [199] 1/17 5/9 2/5 1/7 9/38
Spgr 08 01 [169] 1/17 7/9 2/5 1/7 11/38 Spgr 08 03 [63] 4/17 2/9 1/5 2/7 9/38
Spgr 07 02 [263] 11/17 0/9 1/5 2/7 14/38 Spgr 07 03 [152] 0/17 4/9 0/5 1/7 5/38
Spgr 03 01 [16] 0/17 1/9 0/5 1/7 2/38 Spgr 02 01 [13] 5/17 0/9 1/5 0/7 6/38
Spgr 02 02 [14] 2/17 0/9 1/5 0/7 3/38 SCH 24 02 [114] 2/17 3/9 0/5 3/7 8/38
SCH 28 01 [186] 15/17 1/9 1/5 5/7 22/38 SCH 43 01 [239] 5/17 0/9 0/5 5/7 10/38
Group 1, contains studies that do not appropriately cover the organizational con-
cepts. In this group, we have identified 25 studies out of the 34 selected ones, in-
cluding: ACM 03 Lamsweerde [240], ACM 14 Labda et al. [144], ACM 16 Braghin
et al. [28], ACM 35 Singhal and Wijesekera [211], ACM 40 Wang and Guo [248],
CIT 07 Lasheras et al. [241], IEEE 12 Souag et al. [221], IEEE 15 Tsoumas and
Gritzalis [235], IEEE 57 Kang and Liang [132], Spgr 7 Massacci et al. [162], Spgr 13
Elahi et al. [71], SCH 18 Sindre and Opdahl [208], SCH 24 Kalloniatis et al. [130],
Spgr 18 03 Fenz and Ekelhart [81], Spgr 13 01 Asnar et al. [15], Spgr 13 02 Braber
et al. [59], Spgr 13 04 Ju¨rjens [123], Spgr 13 07 Røstad [199], Spgr 08 01 Mayer
[169], Spgr 08 03 Dritsas et al. [63], Spgr 07 03 Lin et al. [152], Spgr 03 01 Avizˇienis
et al. [16], Spgr 02 01 Asnar et al. [13], Spgr 02 02 Asnar et al. [14], SCH 24 02
Hong et al. [114], SCH 43 01 Blarkom et al. [239].
Group 2, contains studies that do not appropriately cover risk concepts. In this group,
we have identified 22 studies out of the 34 selected ones, including: ACM 14 Labda
et al. [144], ACM 16 Braghin et al. [28], ACM 35 Singhal and Wijesekera [211],
CIT 07 Lasheras et al. [241], IEEE 50 Giorgini et al. [100], IEEE 57 Kang and
Liang [132], SCH 18 Sindre and Opdahl [208], SCH 24 Kalloniatis et al. [130],
SCH 28 Mouratidis and Giorgini [179], SCH 41 Solove [214], Spgr 13 01 Asnar et
al. [15], Spgr 13 02 Braber et al. [59], Spgr 13 04 Ju¨rjens [123], Spgr 08 03 Drit-
sas et al. [63], Spgr 07 02 Zannone [263], Spgr 07 03 Lin et al. [152], Spgr 03 01
Avizˇienis et al. [16], Spgr 02 01 Asnar et al. [13], Spgr 02 02 Asnar et al. [14],
SCH 24 02 Hong et al. [114], SCH 28 01 Paja et al. [186], SCH 43 01 Blarkom et
al. [239].
Group 3, contains studies that do not appropriately cover treatment concepts. In this
group, we have identified 31 studies out of the 34 selected ones, including: ACM 03
Lamsweerde [240], ACM 14 Labda et al. [144], ACM 16 Braghin et al. [28], ACM 35
Singhal and Wijesekera [211], ACM 40 Wang and Guo [248], CIT 07 Lasheras et al.
[241], IEEE 12 Souag et al. [221], IEEE 50 Giorgini et al. [100], IEEE 57 Kang and
Liang [132], Spgr 7 Massacci et al. [162], Spgr 13 Elahi et al. [71], SCH 18 Sindre
and Opdahl [208], SCH 24 Kalloniatis et al. [130], SCH 41 Solove [214], Spgr 18 03
Fenz and Ekelhart [81], Spgr 13 01 Asnar et al. [15], Spgr 13 02 Braber et al. [59],
Spgr 13 03 Elahi et al. [72], Spgr 13 04 Ju¨rjens [123], Spgr 13 05 Matulevicˇius et
al. [167], Spgr 13 07 Røstad [199], Spgr 08 01 Mayer [169], Spgr 08 03 Dritsas et
al. [63], Spgr 07 02 Zannone [263], Spgr 07 03 Lin et al. [152], Spgr 03 01 Avizˇienis
et al. [16], Spgr 02 01 Asnar et al. [13], Spgr 02 02 Asnar et al. [14], SCH 24 02
Hong et al. [114], SCH 28 01 Paja et al. [186], SCH 43 01 Blarkom et al. [239].
Group 4, contains studies that do not appropriately cover the privacy concepts. In
this group, we have identified 31 studies out of the 34 selected ones, including:
ACM 03 Lamsweerde [240], ACM 14 Labda et al. [144], ACM 16 Braghin et al.
[28], ACM 35 Singhal and Wijesekera [211], ACM 40 Wang and Guo [248], CIT 07
Lasheras et al. [241], CIT 33 Liu et al. [155], IEEE 12 Souag et al. [221], IEEE 15
Tsoumas and Gritzalis [235], IEEE 50 Giorgini et al. [100], Spgr 7 Massacci et al.
[162], Spgr 13 Elahi et al. [71], SCH 18 Sindre and Opdahl [208], SCH 24 Kallo-
niatis et al. [130], SCH 28 Mouratidis and Giorgini [179], SCH 41 Solove [214],
Spgr 18 03 Fenz and Ekelhart [81], Spgr 13 01 Asnar et al. [15], Spgr 13 02 Braber
et al. [59], Spgr 13 03 Elahi et al. [72], Spgr 13 04 Ju¨rjens [123], Spgr 13 05 Mat-
ulevicˇius et al. [167], Spgr 13 07 Røstad [199], Spgr 08 01 Mayer [169], Spgr 08 03
Dritsas et al. [63], Spgr 07 02 Zannone [263], Spgr 07 03 Lin et al. [152], Spgr 03 01
Avizˇienis et al. [16], Spgr 02 01 Asnar et al. [13], Spgr 02 02 Asnar et al. [14],
SCH 24 02 Hong et al. [114].
Based on the previous categories, we have 15 studies that do not appropriately
cover all the four concepts categories, and 13 studies that do not appropriately cover
three categories. 5 studies do not appropriately cover two categories, and one study
does not appropriately cover only one categories. A detailed description of the concepts
and relations that each of these studies does not cover can be obtained from Table 4.
Note that most of these studies have not been developed to address privacy related
issues. Therefore, it is not a negative thing when they do not cover privacy related
concepts. RQ4 has been considered in this study to assist authors of selected studies,
if they aim to extend their frameworks and approaches to cover privacy concerns.
4 A novel privacy ontology
Several resent studies stress the need for addressing privacy concerns during the system
design (e.g., Privacy by Design (PbD) [130,144]). Nevertheless, based on the results
of this review, it is easy to note that no existing study covers all the main privacy
concepts/relations that have been identified in the review, i.e., no existing ontology
enables for capturing main privacy aspects and without such ontology it is almost
impossible to address privacy concerns during the system design. Therefore, proposing
such ontology would be a viable solution for this problem. To this end, we propose a
novel privacy ontology based on the main privacy concepts/relations identified in Table
4. The meta-model of our ontology is depicted in Figure 5, and the concepts of the
ontology are organized into four main dimensions:
Organizational dimension: proposes concepts to capture the social and technical
components of the system in terms of their capabilities, objectives, and dependen-
cies.
Risk dimension: proposes concepts to capture risks that might endanger privacy
needs at the social and organizational levels.
Treatment dimension: proposes concepts to capture countermeasure techniques to
mitigate risks to privacy needs.
Privacy dimension: proposes concepts to capture the stakeholders’ (actors) privacy
requirements/needs concerning their personal information.
In what follows, we define each of these dimensions in terms of their concepts and
relations
(1) Organizational dimension.Most current complex systems consist of several
autonomous components that interact and depend on one another for achieving their
objectives. Therefore, this dimension includes the organizational concepts of the sys-
tem, which have been further organized into several categories, including: intentional
entities, entities’ objectives, informational assets, entities interactions, and entities ex-
pectations concerning such interactions (social trust). In what follows, we define each
of these dimensions along with their concepts and relations.
Agentive entities: represent the active entities of the system, we have selected
three concepts along with two relations:
Actor represents an autonomous entity that has intentionality and strategic goals
within the system. Actor can be decomposed into sub-units:
Role is an abstract characterization of an actor in terms of a set of behaviors and
functionalities within some specialized context. A role can be a specialization (is a)
of one another.
Agent is an autonomous entity that has a specific manifestation in the system. An
agent can plays a role or more within the system, i.e., an agent inherits the prop-
erties of the roles it plays.
Intentional entities: the behavior of actors is, usually, determined by the objec-
tives they aim to achieve. Therefore, we adopted the goal concept and and/or decom-
position (refinement) relations to represent such objectives.
Goal is a state of affairs that an actor intends to achieve. When a goal is too coarse
to be achieved, it can be refined through and/or-decompositions of a root goal into
finer sub-goals.
And-decomposition implies that the achievement of the root-goal requires the
achievement of all its sub-goals.
Or-decomposition is used to provide different alternatives to achieve the root goal,
and it implies that the achievement of the root-goal requires the achievement of
any of its sub-goals.
Informational entities: information is one of the most important concepts when
we speak about privacy. Among the available concepts for capturing informational
asset, e.g., data [144], a resource (physical or informational) [100,263,179,162], asset
[132,72], etc., we have adopted the following concepts and relations:
Information represents any informational entity without intentionality. Information
can be atomic or composite (composed of several parts), and we rely on part of
relation to capture the relation between an information entity and its sub-parts. In
the context of this work, we differentiate between two main types of information:
Personal information any information that can be related (directly or indi-
rectly) to an identified or identifiable legal entity (e.g., names, addresses, med-
ical records, etc.), who has the right to control how such information can be
used by others [28,239].
Public information any information that cannot be related (directly or indi-
rectly) to an identified or identifiable legal entity, or personal information that
has been made public by its legal entity [144].
Information type of use: actors may use information to achieve their goals. Our
ontology adopts three relations between goals and information(e.g., produce, read, and
modify), where each of these relations can be defined as follows:
Produce indicates that information can be created by achieving the goal that is re-
sponsible for its production;
Read indicates that the goal achievement depends on consuming such information;
Modify indicates that the goal achievement depends on modifying such information.
Information ownership & permissions: as previously mentioned, we differen-
tiate between personal and public information if it can be related (directly or indirectly)
to an identified or identifiable legal entity. In what follows, we define the own concept
that relates personal information to its legal entity, and we specify how information
owner controls the usage to its personal information.
Own indicates that an actor is the legitimate owner of information, where information
owner has full control over the use of information it owns.
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i.e.,
the owner can control the delegated permissions over information it owns. In our
ontology, information permissions are classified under (P)roduce, (R)ead, (M)odify
permissions, which covers the three relations between goals and information that
our ontology propose.
Entities interactions: actors may not have the required capabilities to achieve
their own objectives by themselves (e.g., achieve a goal, furnish information, etc.).
Therefore, they depend on one another for such objectives. In what follows, we discuss
the concepts that are used for capturing the different actors’ social interactions and
dependencies.
Information provision indicates that an actor has the capability to deliver informa-
tion to another one, where the source of the provision relation is the provider and
the destination is the requester. Information provision has one attribute that de-
scribes the provisioning type, which can be either confidential or non-confidential,
where the first guarantee the confidentiality of the transmitted information while
the last does not.
Goal delegation indicates that one actor delegates the responsibility to achieve a
goal to other actors, where the source of delegation called the delegator , the
destination is called delegatee, and the subject of delegation is called delegatum.
Permissions delegation indicates that an actor delegates the permissions to pro-
duce, read and/or modify over a specific information to another actor.
Entities social trust: the need for trust arises when actors depend on one an-
other for goals or permissions since such dependencies might entail risk [47,98]. More
specifically, a delegator has no warranty that the delegated goal will be achieved or
the delegated permissions will not be misused by the delegatee. Therefore, our ontol-
ogy adopts the notion of trust and distrust to capture the actors’ expectations of one
another concerning their delegations:
Trust indicates the expectation of trustor that the trustee will behave as expected
considering the trustum (e.g., trustee will achieve the delegated goal, or it will not
misuse the delegated permission);
Distrust indicates the expectation of trustor that the trustee will not behave as ex-
pected considering the trustum (e.g., trustee will not achieve the delegated goal,
or it will misuse the delegated permission).
Monitoring: we rely on monitoring to compensate the lack of trust or distrust in
the trustee concerning the trustum [94,263].
Monitoring can be defined as the process of observing and analyzing the performance
of an actor in order to detect any undesirable performance [103], where the source
of monitoring is called the monitor and the destination is called monitoree.
(2) Risk dimension. Risk can be defined as an event that has a negative impact
on the system, i.e., it is the possibility that a particular threat will harm one or more
asset of a system by exploiting a vulnerability [132,211,169,71]. In our ontology, risk
is not a primitive concept and we do not include it into the ontology, since it can be
captured by other concepts such as threat, vulnerabilities, attack, etc. In what follows,
we define the risk dimension related concepts along with their interrelations:
A threat is a potential incident that threaten an asset (personal information) by
exploiting a vulnerability concerning such asset [169,211,132]. A threat can be either
natural (e.g. earthquake, etc.), accidental (e.g. hardware/software failure, etc.),
or intentional (e.g. theft of personal information, etc.)[81,241,220]. Therefore, the
ontology differentiates between two types of threat:
Casual threat (natural or accidental): a threat that does not require a threat actor
nor an attack method.
Intentional threat a threat that require a threat actor and a presumed attack method
[152,162].
Threat actor is an actor that aims for achieving the intentional threat [199,169,71].
Attack method is a standard means by which a threat actor carries out an intentional
threat [169,72,220].
Impact is the consequence of the threat over the asset, and it can be characterized
by a severity attribute that captures the level of the impact (e.g. high, medium or
low) [248,220].
A vulnerability is a weakness in the system, asset (personal information), etc. that
can be exploited by a threat [199,169,211].
(3) Treatment dimension. This dimension introduces countermeasure concepts
to mitigate risks, we adopted a high abstraction level countermeasure concepts to cap-
ture the required protection/treatment level (e.g., privacy goal), which can be refined
into concrete protection/treatment constraints (e.g., mechanisms or policies) that can
be implemented. The concepts of the treatment dimension are:
A privacy goal is an aim to counter threats and prevents harm to personal informa-
tion by satisfying privacy criteria concerning such information.
A privacy constraint is a restriction that is used to realize/satisfy a privacy goal,
constraints can be either a privacy policy or privacy mechanism.
A privacy policy is a privacy statement that defines the permitted and/or forbidden
actions to be carried out by actors of the system toward information.
A privacy mechanism is a concrete technique to be implemented for helping to-
wards the satisfaction of privacy goal (attribute).
(4) Privacy dimension. Introduce concepts to capture the stakeholders’ (actors)
privacy requirements/needs concerning their personal information. The concepts of the
privacy dimension are:
Privacy requirement is used to capture the actors’ (personal information
owner/subject) privacy needs at a high abstraction level, and it is specialized from
the privacy goal concept. Moreover, privacy requirement concept is further spe-
cialized into five more refined concepts.
Confidentiality, means personal information should be kept secure from any poten-
tial leaks and improper access [214,63,144]. We rely on the following principles to
analyze confidentiality:
Non-disclosure, personal information can only be disclosed if the owner’s con-
sent is provided, i.e., the disclosure of the personal information should be under
the control of its legitimate owner [214,63,28,144]. Note that non-disclosure
also cover information transmission that is why we differentiate between two
types of information provision (confidential and non-confidential).
Need to know (NtK), an actor should only use information if it is strictly nec-
essary for completing a certain task [144,186].
Purpose of use, personal information should only be used for specific, explicit,
legitimate purposes and not further used in a way that is incompatible with
those purposes [239,214,63]. Purpose of use is able to address situations where
an actor might be granted a permission to use some personal information for
a legitimate purpose, yet after accessing it, he/she might use the information
for some other purpose.
Notice, the data subject (information owner) should be notified when its information
is being collected [239,214,63]. Notice is considered mainly to address situations
where personal information related to a legitimate entity (data subject) is being
collected without his/her knowledge.
Anonymity, the identity of the information owner should not be disclosed unless
it is required [63,214], i.e., the primary/secondary identifiers of the data subject
(e.g., name, social security number, address, etc. ) should be removed if they are
not required and information still can be used for the same purpose after their
removal. We rely on part of relation to model the internal structure of personal
information, i.e., we link the identifiers of the data subject with the rest of the
information item by the part of relation. If the identifiers are not required for the
task, they can be easily removed, and information can be used without linking it
back to its owner/data subject (unlinkability).
Transparency, information owner should be able to know who is using his/her infor-
mation and for what purposes [239,63,132]. We rely on the following principles to
analyze transparency:
Authentication, a mechanism that aims at verifying whether actors are who
they claim they are [186].
Authorization, a mechanism that aims at verifying whether actors can use in-
formation in accordance with their credentials [63].
Accountability, information owner should have a mechanism available to them
to hold information users accountable for their actions concerning information
[63,132]. We rely on the following principles to analyze accountability:
Non-repudiation, the delegator cannot repudiate he/she delegated; and the del-
egatee cannot repudiate he/she accepted the delegation [132,186].
Not-re-delegation, the delegatee is requested by the delegator not to re-delegate
the delegatum, i.e., the re-delegation of a goal/permission is forbidden [186].
5 Threats to validity
After presenting and discussing our systematic literature review, we discuss the threats
to its validity in this section. Following Runeson et al. [200], we classify threats to
validity under four types: construct, internal, external and reliability:
1- Construct threats: is concerned with to what extent a test measures what
it claims to be measuring [200]. Construct validity is particularly important, since it
might influence the internal validity as well [158]. We have identified the following
threats:
Poor conceptualization of the construct: occurs when the predicted outcome of
the study is defined too narrowly [158], i.e., using only one factor to analyze the sub-
ject of the study. To avoid this threat, the research objective has been transformed
into several research questions and for each of these questions, several factors were
specified to evaluate whether they have been properly answered. In addition, we
followed the best practices in the area to define the criteria while searching for and
selecting the related studies (e.g., inclusion and exclusion criteria, quality assess-
ment criteria, etc.).
Systematic error: may occur while designing and conducting the review. To avoid
such threat, the review protocol has been carefully designed based on well-adopted
methods, and it has been strictly followed during the different phases of the review.
2- Internal threats: is concerned with factors that have not been considered in the
study, and they could have influenced the investigated factors in the study [233,200].
One internal threat has been identified:
Publication bias: publication bias is a common threat to the validity of systematic
reviews, and it refers to a situation where positive research results are more likely
to be reported than negatives ones [136]. Our review focused on finding privacy
related concepts/relations by reviewing the related literature, and there are no
positive nor negative research results in such case. Despite this, we have specified
very clear inclusion and exclusion criteria, and quality assessment criteria while
searching for and selecting the related studies.
3- External threats: is concerned with to what extent the results of the study
can be generalized [200]. One internal threat has been identified:
Completeness: it is almost impossible to capture all related studies, yet our review
protocol and search strategy were very carefully designed to cover as much as
possible of the related studies. In addition, we might exclude some relevant non-
English published studies since we only considered English studies in this review.
To mitigate this limitation we performed a manual scan of the references of all the
primary selected studies in order to identify those studies that were missed during
the first search stage. However, we cannot guarantee that we have identified all the
main available studies, which can be used to answer our research questions.
4- Reliability threats: is concerned with to what extent the study is dependent
on the researcher(s), i.e., if another researcher(s) conducted the same study, the result
should be the same. The search terms, search sources, inclusion and exclusion criteria,
quality assessment questions, etc. are all available, and any researcher can repeat the
review and he should get similar results. However, the researcher should take into con-
sideration the time when the studies search process was performed, i.e., the researcher
should limit the search time to March 2016.
6 Related work
There are few systematic reviews concerning privacy/securities ontologies. For instance,
Souag et al. [219] performed a systematic review that proposes an analysis and a
typology of existing security ontologies. While Blanco et al. [24] conducted a systematic
review with a main aim for identifying, extracting and analyzing the main proposals
for security ontologies. Fabian et al. [78] present a conceptual framework for security
requirements engineering by mapping the diverse terminologies of different security
requirements engineering methods to that framework. Moreover, a security ontology
for capturing security requirements have been presented in [220]. However, the focus
of all the previously mentioned studies was security ontology.
On the other hand, Blanco et al. [23] conduct a systematic review for extracting
the key requirements that an integrated and unified security ontology should have.
While Mellado et al. [172] carried out a systematic review of the existing literature
concerning security requirements engineering in order to summarize the current con-
tributions and to provide a road map for future research in this area. Iankoulova and
Daneva [117] performed a systematic review concerning the security requirements of
cloud computing. In particular, they have classified the main identified security require-
ments under nine sub-areas: access control, attack/harm detection, non-repudiation,
integrity, security auditing, physical protection, privacy, recovery, and prosecution. Li
[150] conducted a systematic review concerning online information privacy concerns,
consequences, and moderating effects. Based on the review outcome, he proposed a
framework to illustrate the relationships between the previously mentioned factors and
to highlight opportunities for further improvement. Finally, Ferna´ndez-Alema´n et al.
[83] performed systematic literature review for identifying and analyzing critical pri-
vacy and security aspects of the electronic health record systems.
7 Conclusions and Future Work
In this paper, we argued that many wrong design decisions might be made due to the
insufficient knowledge about the privacy-related concepts, and we advocate that a well-
defined privacy ontology that captures the privacy related concepts along with their
interrelations can solve this problem. Therefore, we conduct a systematic review con-
cerning the existing privacy/security literature with a main purpose of identifying the
main concepts along with their interrelation for capturing privacy requirements. The
objectives of the research were considered to have been achieved since the research ques-
tions posed have been answered. Moreover, we used the identified concepts/relations
for proposing a privacy ontology to be used by software engineers while dealing with
privacy requirements.
For future work, we aim to develop core privacy ontology to be used by soft-
ware/security engineers when dealing with privacy requirements. To achieve that, we
are planning to contact the authors of the selected studies to get their feedback concern-
ing the proposed privacy ontology. In addition, we will conduct a controlled experiment
with software/security engineers to evaluate the usability of the ontology. Finally, we
plan to evaluate the completeness and validity of the ontology by deploying it to cap-
ture the privacy requirements for two real case studies that belong to different domains
(e.g., medical sector and public administration).
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Appendix A: Quality assessment application
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Appendix B: Overview of all the considered studies
Table 8: Overview of all the considered studies
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Balancing Conden-
tiality, Integrity
and Availability
Martin S Olivier 2002 30 Excluded
stage 1
002 ACM 02
[40]
Improving privacy
and security in
multi-authority
attribute-based
encryption
Melissa Chase,
Sherman
S.M. Chow
2009 375 Excluded
stage 2
003 ACM 03
[240]
Elaborating Security
Requirements
by Construction
of Intentional
Anti-Models
Axel van
Lamsweerde
2004 337 Selected
004 ACM 04
[197]
Preserving Privacy
in Web Services
Abdelmounaam
Rezgui, Mourad
Ouzzani, Athman
Bouguettaya,
Medjahed Brahim
2002 102 Excluded
stage 2
005 ACM 05
[141]
Privacy analysis
using ontologies
Martin Kost,
Johann Christoph
Freytag
2012 9 Excluded
stage 2
006 ACM 06
[92]
Discovering
Multidimensional
Correlations
among Regulatory
Requirements to
Understand Risk
Robin A. Gandhi,
Seok Won Lee
2011 7 Excluded
stage 2
007 ACM 07
[113]
Event-based
applications
and enabling
technologies
Hinze Annika Kai
Sachs, Alejandro
Buchmann
2009 110 Excluded
stage 2
008 ACM 08
[184]
Managing security
and privacy in
ubiquitous eHealth
information
interchange
Ebenezer A.
Oladimeji,
Lawrence Chung,
Hyo Taeg Jung,
Kim Jaehyoun
2011 12 Excluded
stage 2
009 ACM 09
[143]
Deriving
implementation-level
policies for usage
control enforcement
Prachi Ku-
mari, Alexander
Pretschner
2012 18 Excluded
stage 1
010 ACM 10
[224]
SAFE: Secure
and Big Data-
Adaptive Framework
for Efficient
Cross-Domain
Communication
Avinash Srinivasan,
Wu Jie, Zhu Wen
2014 1 Excluded
stage 2
011 ACM 11
[253]
Mining and
Analysing Secu-
rity Goal Models
in Health Infor-
mation Systems
Jens H. Weber-
Jahnke, On-
abajo Adeniyi
2009 6 Excluded
stage 2
012 ACM 12
[122]
Decision support
for partially
moving applications
to the cloud:
the example of
business intelligence
Adrian Juan-
Verdejo, Hen-
ning Baars
2013 10 Excluded
stage 2
013 ACM 13
[181]
Surprise: user-
controlled granular
privacy and security
for personal data
in Smarter Context
Juan C. Mun˜oz,
Tamura Gabriel,
Norha M. Ville-
gas, and Hausi
A. Mu¨ller
2012 5 Excluded
stage 2
014 ACM 14
[144]
Modeling of
privacy-aware
business processes
in BPMN to protect
personal data
Wadha JLabda,
Nikolay Mehand-
jiev, Pedro Sampaio
2014 0 Selected
015 ACM 15
[145]
A conceptual meta-
model for secured
information systems
Nadira Lammari,
Jean-Sylvain
Bucumi, Jacky
Akoka, Isabelle
Comyn-Wattiau
2011 2 Excluded
stage 1
016 ACM 16
[28]
Introducing privacy
in a hospital
information system
Stefano Braghin,
Alberto Coen-
Porisini, Pietro
Colombo, Sabrina
Sicari, Alberto
Trombetta
2008 9 Selected
017 ACM 17
[53]
How to capture,
model, and verify
the knowledge
of legal, security,
and privacy
experts: a pattern-
based approach
Luca Compagna,
Paul El Khoury,
Fabio Massacci,
Thomas Reshma,
Nicola Zannone
2007 29 Excluded
stage 2
018 ACM 18
[262]
Enforcing a
Security Pattern
in Stakeholder
Goal Models
Yijun Yu, Kaiya
Haruhiko,
Washizaki Hironori,
Xiong Yingfei,
Hu Zhenjiang,
Yoshioka Nobukazu
2008 17 Excluded
stage 2
019 ACM 19
[168]
The production
rule framework:
developing a canon-
ical set of software
requirements for
compliance with law
Jeremy C. Maxwell,
Annie I. Anto´n
2010 15 Excluded
stage 2
020 ACM 20
[230]
Security issues
in a SOA-Based
provenance system
Victor Tan, Paul
Groth, Simon
Miles, Sheng Jiang,
Steve Munroe,
Sofia Tsasakou,
Luc Moreau
2006 73 Excluded
stage 1
021 ACM 21 [8] A scheme for
privacy-preserving
ontology mapping
Toshiyuki Ama-
gasa,Fan Zhang,
Jun Sakuma,
Hiroyuki Kitagawa
2014 0 Excluded
stage 1
022 ACM 22
[226]
Privacy pre-
serving modules
for ontologies
Thomas Studer 2010 4 Excluded
stage 2
023 ACM 23
[176]
Privacy-preserving
semantic interop-
eration and access
control of hetero-
geneous databases
Prasenjit Mitra,
Chi-Chun Pan,
Peng Liu, and Vi-
jayalakshmi Atluri
2006 35 Excluded
stage 2
024 ACM 24
[227]
Trust-terms ontology
for defining security
requirements
and metrics
Kieran Sullivan,
Jim Clarke,
Barry P. Mulcahy
2010 3 Excluded
stage 2
025 ACM 25
[125]
User-centric social
context information
management:
an ontology-
based approach
and platform
Muhammad
Ashad Kabir,
Jun Han, Jian
Yu, Alan Colman
2014 9 Excluded
stage 1
026 ACM 26
[157]
A collaborative on-
tology development
tool for information
security managers
John C. Mace,
Simon Parkin,
Aad van Moorsel
2010 6 Excluded
stage 2
027 ACM 27
[18]
Privacy-Preserving
Reasoning on the
Semantic Web
Jie Bao, Giora
Slutzki, Vas-
ant Honavar
2007 37 Duplicated
028 ACM 28
[206]
The Epistemology of
Computer Security
Robert Schaefer 2009 6 Excluded
stage 2
029 ACM 29
[198]
A Survey on
Ontologies for
Human Behavior
Recognition
Rodr´ıguez, Natalia
Dı´az and Cue´llar,
Manuel P Lilius,
Johan Calvo-Flores,
Miguel Delgado
2014 17 Excluded
stage 1
030 ACM 30
[258]
A framework for
specifying and
managing security
requirements in col-
laborative systems
Stephen S. Yau,
Chen Zhaoji
2006 17 Excluded
stage 2
031 ACM 31
[74]
Isn’t the Time Ripe
for a Standard
Ontology on Secu-
rity of Information
and Networks?
Atilla Elc¸i 2014 3 Excluded
stage 1
032 ACM 32 [5] Model driven se-
curity engineering
for the realization
of dynamic security
requirements in col-
laborative systems
Muhammad Alam 2007 14 Excluded
stage 1
033 ACM 33
[57]
CoreSec: an
ontology of security
applied to the
business process
of management
Ryan Ribeiro
de Azevedo,
Fred Freitas,
Silas Cardoso de
Almeida, Marcelo
Jos SC Almeida,
Edson C. de Barros
C Filho, Wendell
Campos Veras
2008 1 Excluded
stage 1
034 ACM 34
[80]
Ontology-based
generation of
IT-security metrics
Stefan Fenz 2010 21 Excluded
stage 2
035 ACM 35
[211]
Ontologies for
Modeling En-
terprise Level
Security Metrics
Singhal Anoop, Wi-
jesekera Duminda
2010 7 Selected
036 ACM 36
[22]
A Security Ontology
for Incident Analysis
Clive Blackwell 2007 7 Excluded
stage 2
037 ACM 37
[54]
Dealing with the
formal analysis
of Information
Security policies
through ontologies:
a case study
Da Silva, G. M.
H., Rademaker,
A., Vasconcelos,
D. R., Amaral,
F. N., Baz´ılio,
C., Costa, V. G.,
Haeusler, E. H
2007 3 Excluded
stage 2
038 ACM 38
[148]
Building problem
domain ontology
from security
requirements in reg-
ulatory documents
Lee, Seok-Won,
Robin Gandhi,
Divya Muthurajan,
Yavagal Deepak.
Ahn Gail-Joon
2006 42 Excluded
stage 1
039 ACM 39
[247]
Ontology-based
analysis of infor-
mation security
standards and
capabilities for
their harmonization
Vladimir I Voro-
biev, Ludmila
Fedorchenko,
Vadim P Zabolot-
sky, Alexander
V Lyubimov
2010 2 Excluded
stage 1
040 ACM 40
[248]
OVM: an ontology
for vulnerability
management
Ju An Wang,
Guo Minzhe
2009 40 Selected
041 IEEE 01
[127]
Authorization and
privacy for semantic
Web services
Lalana Kagal, Tim
Finin, Massimo
Paolucci, Naveen
Srinivasan, Katia
Sycara, Grit Denker
2004 242 Excluded
stage 1
042 IEEE 02
[84]
Surveillance
ontology for
legal, ethical and
privacy protection
based on SKOS
Virginia Fernandez
Arguedas, Ebroul
Izquierdo, Krishna
Chandramouli
2013 1 Excluded
stage 1
043 IEEE 03
[142]
Privacy Verification
Using Ontologies
Martin Kost,
Johann-Christoph
Freytag, Frank
Kargl, An-
tonio Kung
2011 10 Excluded
stage 2
044 IEEE 04
[135]
A Semantic Policy
Framework for
Context-Aware
Access Control
Applications
ASM Kayes, Jun
Han, Alan Colman
2013 1 Excluded
stage 1
045 IEEE 05
[153]
A Proxy for Privacy:
the Discreet Box
Georgios V. Li-
oudakis, Eleftherios
A. Koutsoloukas,
Nikolaos Dellas,
Sofia Kapellaki,
George N. Prez-
erakos, Dimitra
I. Kaklamani,
Iakovos S. Venieris
2007 9 Excluded
stage 1
046 IEEE 06
[178]
Semantic annota-
tions for security
policy matching
in WS-Policy
Giuseppe Di
Modica, Orazio
Tomarchio
2011 1 Excluded
stage 1
047 IEEE 07
[178]
Semantic Security
Policy Matching in
Service Oriented
Architectures
Giuseppe Di
Modica, Orazio
Tomarchio
2011 4 Excluded
stage 1
048 IEEE 08
[64]
Security Require-
ments for a Seman-
tic Service-oriented
Architecture
Stefan Du¨rbeck,
Rolf Schillinger,
Jan Kolter
2007 14 Excluded
stage 1
049 IEEE 09
[193]
Privacy compliance
in European health
grid domains:
An ontology-
based approach
Hanene Boussi
Rahmouni, Tony
Solomonides,
Marco Casassa
Mont, Simon Shiu
2009 9 Excluded
stage 2
050 IEEE 10
[45]
An Ontological
Study of Data
Purpose for Privacy
Policy Enforcement
Shan Chen, Mary-
Anne Williams
2011 0 Excluded
stage 1
051 IEEE 11
[151]
Ontology-based
Negotiation of
Security Require-
ments in Cloud
Loredana Liccardo,
Massimiliano
Rak, Giuseppe
Di Modica,
Orazio Tomarchio
2012 2 Excluded
stage 2
052 IEEE 12
[221]
Using Security and
Domain ontologies
for Security Re-
quirements Analysis
Amina Souag,
Camille Salinesi,
Isabelle Wattiau,
Haris Mouratidis
2013 4 Selected
053 IEEE 13
[56]
Pattern-based
security require-
ments specification
using ontologies
and boilerplates
Olawande
Daramola, Gut-
torm Sindre,
Tor Stalhane
2012 4 Excluded
stage 2
054 IEEE 14
[259]
Hierarchical Situa-
tion Modeling and
Reasoning for Per-
vasive Computing
Stephen S Yau,
Junwei Liu
2006 83 Excluded
stage 2
055 IEEE 15
[235]
Towards an
Ontology-based Se-
curity Management
TSOUMAS
Bill, GRITZA-
LIS Dimitris
2006 88 Selected
056 IEEE 16
[137]
Security oriented
service composition:
A framework
Khaled M Khan,
Abdelkarim
Erradi, Saleh
Alhazbi, Jun Han
2012 3 Excluded
stage 1
057 IEEE 17
[111]
Multi-agent security
service architecture
for mobile learning
Manana Hentea 2004 6 Excluded
stage 1
058 IEEE 18
[223]
Achieving privacy
in trust negotiations
with an ontology-
based approach
A. C. Squicciarini,
E. Bertino, E.
Ferrari, I. Ray
2006 50 Excluded
stage 2
059 IEEE 19
[86]
Engineering Safety
and Security Related
Requirements
for Software
Intensive Systems
Donald G.
Firesmith
2007 30 Excluded
stage 2
060 IEEE 20
[43]
Intelligent agents
meet the semantic
Web in smart spaces
Harry Chen, Tim
Finin, Anupam
Joshi, Lalana
Kagal, Filip
Perich, Dipanjan
Chakraborty
2004 277 Excluded
stage 1
061 IEEE 21
[249]
Environmental
Metrics for Software
Security Based
on a Vulnera-
bility Ontology
Ju An Wang,
Minzhe Guo, Hao
Wang, Min Xia,
Linfeng Zhou
2009 4 Excluded
stage 2
062 IEEE 22
[27]
The image pro-
tector - A flexible
security rule
specification toolkit
Bechara Al Bouna,
Richard Chbeir,
Alban Gabillon
2011 9 Excluded
stage 1
063 IEEE 23
[20]
Semantic matching
of web services
security policies
Monia Ben Brahim,
Tarak Chaari,
Maher Ben Jemaa,
Mohamed Jmaiel
2012 1 Excluded
stage 1
064 IEEE 24
[46]
The design of an
ontology-based
service-oriented
architecture
framework for
traditional Chinese
medicine healthcare
Shih-Wei Chen,
Yu-Ting Tseng,
Tsai-Ya Lai
2012 0 Excluded
stage 1
065 IEEE 25
[44]
Soupa: Standard
ontology for ubiqui-
tous and pervasive
applications
Harry Chen, Filip
Perich, Tim Finin,
Anupam Joshi
2004 634 Excluded
stage 2
066 IEEE 26 [4] Ontology of
e-Learning security
Galyna Akmayeva,
Charles Shoniregun
2010 2 Excluded
stage 2
067 IEEE 27
[255]
The Design and
Enforcement of
a Rule-based
Constraint Policy
Language for
Service Composition
Wei Wei, Ting Yu 2010 1 Excluded
stage 1
068 IEEE 28
[52]
Context Ontol-
ogy for Secure
Interoperability
Celine Coma, Nora
Cuppens-Boulahia1,
Frederic Cuppens,
Ana Rosa Cavalli
2008 17 Excluded
stage 2
069 IEEE 29
[205]
Towards knowl-
edge level privacy
and security us-
ing RDF/RDFS
and RBAC
Rishi Kanth
Saripalle, Alberto
De la Rosa
Algarin, Timoteus
B. Ziminski
2015 0 Excluded
stage 1
070 IEEE 30
[160]
Detecting privacy
in attention
aware system
Maisonnasse,
Je´ro´me, Nicolas
Gourier, Oliver
Brdiczka, Patrick
Reignier, James
L. Crowley
2006 4 Excluded
stage 2
071 IEEE 31
[245]
Specifying Dynamic
Security Properties
of Web Service
Based Systems
Artem Voro-
biev, Jun Han
2006 17 Excluded
stage 1
072 IEEE 32
[73]
Semantic Access
Control in Web
Based Communities
Najeeb Elahi,
Mohammad
MR Chowd-
hury, Josef Noll
2008 34 Excluded
stage 1
073 IEEE 33
[95]
An Approach for
Privacy Protection
Based-On Ontology
Feng Gao, Jingsha
He, Shufen Peng,
Xu Wu, Xiu Liu
2010 9 Excluded
stage 2
074 IEEE 34
[116]
A Light-Weight
Ranger Intrusion
Detection System
on Wireless
Sensor Networks
Chia-Fen Hsieh,
Yung-Fa Huang,
Rung-Ching Chen
2011 8 Excluded
stage 1
075 IEEE 35
[39]
Knowledge modeling
for privacy-by-
design in smart
surveillance solution
Krishna Chan-
dramouli,
Virginia Fer-
nandez Arguedas,
Ebroul Izquierdo
2013 0 Excluded
stage 2
076 IEEE 36
[209]
A comparative
study of Cloud
Security Ontologies
Vaishali Singh,
S.K. Pandey
2014 0 Excluded
stage 2
077 IEEE 37
[18]
Privacy-Preserving
Reasoning on the
Semantic Web
Jie Bao, Giora
Slutzki, Vas-
ant Honavar
2007 37 Excluded
stage 1
078 IEEE 38
[147]
Ontology of
Secure Service
Level Agreement
Chen-Yu Lee,
Krishna M. Kavi,
Paul Raymond,
Gomathisankaran
Mahadevan
2015 0 Excluded
stage 2
079 IEEE 39
[140]
Contrology -
An Ontology-
Based Cloud
Assurance Approach
Ulrich Koinig,
Simon Tjoa,
Jungwoo Ryoo
2015 0 Excluded
stage 1
080 IEEE 40
[204]
Secure Enterprise
Interoperability
Ontology for Seman-
tic Integration of
Business to Business
Applications
Emmanuel Sardis,
Spyridon V Gogou-
vitis, Thanassis
Bouras, Panagiotis
Gouvas, Theodora
Varvarigou
2015 0 Excluded
stage 1
081 IEEE 41
[96]
Towards a base
ontology for privacy
protection in service-
oriented architecture
Diego Garcia, M.
Beatriz F. Toledo,
Miriam A. M.
Capretz, David S.
Allison, Gordon S.
Blair, Paul Grace,
Carlos Flores
2009 1 Excluded
stage 2
082 IEEE 42
[82]
Information Security
Fortification by
Ontological Mapping
of the ISO/IEC
27001 Standard
Fenz, Stefan,
Gernot Goluch,
Andreas Ekelhart,
Bernhard Riedl,
Edgar Weippl
2007 45 Excluded
stage 2
083 IEEE 43 [3] CCTB: Context
Correlation for
Trust Bootstrapping
in Pervasive
Environment
Ahamed, Sheikh
Monjur, Mehrab,
Mohammad
Saiful Islam
2008 9 Excluded
stage 1
084 IEEE 44
[12]
An interoperable se-
curity framework for
connected healthcare
Muhammad
Asim, Milan
Petkovi/’c, Mike
Qu, Changjie Wang
2011 2 Excluded
stage 1
085 IEEE 45
[101]
A framework for
security driven
software evolution
Hui Guan, Xuan
Wang, Hongj Yang
2014 0 Excluded
stage 1
086 IEEE 46
[254]
Research on
Semantic-Based
Security Services
Model of SOA
Cuncun Wei,
Guanghua Chen,
Qianqian Ge
2009 0 Excluded
stage 1
087 IEEE 47 [3] CCTB: Context
Correlation for
Trust Bootstrapping
in Pervasive
Environment
Ahamed, Sheikh
I and Monjur,
Mehrab and Islam,
Mohammad Saiful
2008 9 Duplicated
088 IEEE 48
[50]
Enabling Access
Control and Privacy
through Ontology
Mohammad M.
R. Chowdhury,
JosefNoll’ and Juan
Miguel Gomez
2007 8 Excluded
stage 2
089 IEEE 49
[21]
What is com-
puter security?
Matt Bishop 2003 1916 Excluded
stage 2
090 IEEE 50
[100]
Modeling secu-
rity requirements
through owner-
ship, permission
and delegation
Paolo Giorgini,
Fabio Massacci,
John Mylopoulos
and Nicola Zannone
2005 198 Selected
091 IEEE 51
[110]
Privacy Ontology
Support for
E-Commerce
Michael Hecker,
Tharam S.
Dillon, and
Elizabeth Chang
2008 31 Excluded
stage 2
092 IEEE 52
[105]
Use of Ontology
Technology for
Standardization of
Medical Records
and Dealing
with Associated
Privacy Issues
Maja Hadzic,
Dillon Tharam,
Elizabeth Chang
2006 4 Excluded
stage 2
093 IEEE 53
[131]
Ontology Align-
ment in RFID
Privacy Protection
Masakazu Kanbe,
Shuichiro
Yamamoto
2009 2 Excluded
stage 1
094 IEEE 54
[25]
Enhancing Privacy
and Authorization
Control Scalability
in the Grid
Through Ontologies
Ignacio Blanquer,
Herna´ndez Vicente,
Segrelles Damia´,
Erik Torres
2009 25 Excluded
stage 2
095 IEEE 55
[76]
Ontology-Based
Security Adaptation
at Run-Time
Antti Evesti,
Eila Ovaska
2010 12 Excluded
stage 1
096 IEEE 56
[231]
A framework for
multi-agent system
engineering using
ontology domain
modelling for
security architecture
risk assessment
in e-commerce
security services
Gustavo A.
Santana Torrellas
2004 10 Excluded
stage 2
097 IEEE 57
[132]
A Security Ontology
with MDA for Soft-
ware Development
Wentao Kang,
Liang Ying
2013 1 Selected
098 IEEE 58
[244]
Security Attack
Ontology for
Web Services
Artem Vorobiev
and Jun Han
2006 64 Excluded
stage 2
099 IEEE 59
[257]
Ontology-Based
Information Content
Security Analysis
Pan Yan, Zhao
Yanping,
Sanxing Cao
2008 7 Excluded
stage 2
100 IEEE 60
[68]
Security Ontologies:
Improving Quanti-
tative Risk Analysis
Ekelhart, Andreas,
Stefan Fenz,
Markus Klemen,
Edgar Weippl
2007 88 Excluded
stage 2
101 IEEE 61
[55]
An Ontology for
Run-Time Verifi-
cation of Security
Certificates for SOA
Stefania D’Agostini,
Valeria Di Giacomo,
Claudia Pandolfo,
Domenico Presenza
2012 4 Excluded
stage 1
102 IEEE 62
[260]
An adaptable
security frame-
work for service-
based systems
Stephen S Yau,
Yisheng Yao, Zhaoji
Chen, Luping Zhu
2005 13 Excluded
stage 1
103 CIT 01
[192]
Property attesta-
tionscalable and
privacy-friendly
security assessment
of peer computers
Jonathan Poritz,
Matthias Schunter,
Els Van Her-
reweghen, and
Michael Waidner
2004 137 Excluded
stage 2
104 CIT 02
[102]
Formal Ontology
and Informa-
tion Systems
Nicola Guarino 1998 4406 Excluded
stage 1
105 CIT 03
[221]
Using Security and
Domain ontologies
for Security Re-
quirements Analysis
Amina Souag,
Camille Salinesi,
Isabelle Wattiau,
Haris Mouratidis
2013 4 Duplicated
106 CIT 04
[141]
Privacy analysis
using ontologies
Martin Kost,
Johann-
Christoph Freytag
2012 9 Duplicated
107 CIT 05 [79] Ontologies: A
Silver Bullet
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Management
and Electronic
Dieter Fensel 2000 23 Excluded
stage 1
108 CIT 06
[142]
Privacy Verification
using Ontologies
Martin Kost,
Johann-
Christoph Freytag
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109 CIT 07
[241]
Modeling Reusable
Security Require-
ments Based on an
Ontology Framework
Joaqu´ın Lasheras,
Rafael Valencia-
Garc´ıa, Jesu-
aldo Toma´s
Ferna´ndez-Breis
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110 CIT 08 [90] A Security Archi-
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Kesselman,
Gene Tsudik,
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1998 1765 Excluded
stage 1
111 CIT 09 [30] Analyzing regulatory
rules for privacy
and security
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2008 251 Excluded
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112 CIT 10
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Security Ontology
for Annotat-
ing Resources
Kim Anya, Jim
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113 CIT 11
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SPINS: Security
Protocols for
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stage 1
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Oded Goldreich,
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paper
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interpretation of in-
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117 CIT 15 [67] Ontological mapping
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Andreas Ekclhart,
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Security Attack
Ontology for
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An Ontology
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2003 65 Excluded
stage 2
134 CIT 32 [66] Reasoning with
rules and ontologies
Thomas Eiter,
Giovambattista
Ianni, Axel Polleres,
Roman Schindlauer,
Hans Tompits
2006 75 Excluded
stage 1
135 CIT 33
[155]
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A comparison of se-
curity requirements
engineering methods
Fabian Benjamin,
Seda Gurses,
Maritta Heisel,
Thomas Santen,
Holger Schmidt
2010 129 Excluded
stage 2
- Survey
paper
140 Spgr 03
[219]
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